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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case presents the issue of whether the Virgin Islands 
Writ of Review statute, 5 V.I.C. SS 1421-23, provides the 
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands with jurisdiction to 
review an employment arbitration decision that binds the 
Government of the Virgin Islands in its role as an employer. 
We are also faced with the question of whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. SS 1-16, applies in the 
Territorial Court. 
 
We hold that the Writ of Review statute gives the 
Territorial Court jurisdiction to review actions of 
government actors only, as distinct from private actors. 
Because the arbitrator whose conduct is at issue here was 
not a government actor, the Writ of Review statute cannot 
apply to the instant case. We also hold that the provisions 
of the FAA and the standards developed by our 
jurisprudence in reviewing arbitrations under the FAA are 
enforceable in the Territorial Court. 
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I. 
 
Defendant Lawrence Acker commenced his employment 
with plaintiff Virgin Islands Department of Justice ("DOJ") 
as an Assistant Attorney General in the fall of 1987. The 
DOJ alleges that Acker took unauthorized leaves of 
absences beginning in 1988 and continuing into early 
1990. In the spring of 1990, the DOJ suspended Acker, 
giving sixteen reasons for doing so, pending review of his 
alleged unauthorized absences and withheld his pay. 
Acker's union, defendant United Industrial Workers of 
North America, Seafarers International Union, AFL-CIO 
("Union"), filed a grievance on Acker's behalf. 
 
Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") 
between the DOJ and the Union, the DOJ and the Union 
met to discuss the grievance ("Grievance Meeting"), but 
their efforts produced no solution. The Union demanded 
arbitration, again pursuant to the CBA, and the DOJ and 
the Union selected an arbitrator, Robert A. Ellison 
("Arbitrator"), to conduct the arbitration. 
 
Before deciding the substantive issue of Acker's 
suspension and termination, the Arbitrator considered and 
decided two procedural arguments raised by the DOJ. First, 
the DOJ claimed that Acker's grievance had not been timely 
filed. The Arbitrator decided that Acker's grievance had 
been filed within the specified ten days provided in the CBA 
after he received his termination letter on March 15, 1990.1 
Second, the DOJ argued that although Acker was present 
at the Grievance Meeting, his behavior at the Grievance 
Meeting amounted to a failure to participate, which was a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate.2 The Arbitrator rejected this 
argument as well. On the substantive issue of Acker's 
termination, the Arbitrator ruled that the DOJ's decision to 
terminate Acker was unjust and he ordered Acker to be 
reinstated with back-pay. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The DOJ had argued that the dispute "ripened" on February 12, 1990, 
the date on which Acker's termination was effective. However, the 
termination letter was dated March 15, 1990. 
 
2. The appellate record does not specify the particulars of Acker's 
conduct at the Grievance Meeting. 
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The DOJ filed a Writ of Review under 5 V.I.C.SS 1421-23 
in the Virgin Islands Territorial Court ("Territorial Court"), 
seeking vacation of the arbitration award. The Writ of 
Review statute provides: 
 
       Any party to any proceeding before or by any officer, 
       board, commission, authority, or tribunal may have the 
       decision or determination thereof reviewed for errors 
       therein as prescribed in this chapter and the rules of 
       court. Upon the review, the court may review any 
       intermediate order involving the merits necessarily 
       affecting the decision or determination sought to be 
       reviewed. 
 
5 V.I.C. S 1421 (1997).3 The DOJ asserted in the Territorial 
Court that the Arbitrator was biased because he had rented 
office space from counsel for the Union. The DOJ also 
argued to the Territorial Court, as it had to the Arbitrator, 
that the Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over Acker's 
grievance because Acker did not meaningfully participate in 
the Grievance Meeting. 
 
The Territorial Court held that it did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction because 5 V.I.C. S 1421 only permitted 
review of actions of governmental officers or entities. The 
Territorial Court further held that the Federal Arbitration 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 5 V.I.C. S 1422 provides: 
 
       The writ of review shall be allowed in all cases where there is no 
       appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where the 
       officer, board, commission, authority, or tribunal in the exercise 
of 
       his or its functions appears to have exercised such functions 
       erroneously, or to have exceeded his or its jurisdiction, to the 
injury 
       of some substantial right of the plaintiff. 
 
5 V.I.C. S 1423 provides: 
 
       Upon the review provided for in this chapter the court shall have 
       power to affirm, modify, reverse, or annul the decision or 
       determination reviewed, and, if necessary, to award restitution to 
       the plaintiff, or, by mandate, direct the officer, board, 
commission, 
       authority, or tribunal to proceed in the matter reviewed according 
to 
       its decision. From the judgment of the district court on review an 
       appeal may be taken in like manner and with like effect as from a 
       judgment of such district court in a civil action. 
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Act, 9 U.S.C. SS 1-16, barred any review of the Arbitrator's 
decision. 
 
The DOJ appealed to the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, Appellate Division ("District Court"), which agreed 
with the Territorial Court that 5 V.I.C. S 1421 did not 
provide the Territorial Court with subject matter 
jurisdiction: "[W]e hold that the Territorial Court does not 
have jurisdiction to review a private arbitrator's decision 
under the Writ of Review statute." Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. United Industrial Workers of Am., D.C. Civ. App. 
No. 1992-022 (D.V.I. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1997), at 10. 
However, the District Court went on to hold that the 
Territorial Court did have jurisdiction to review the 
Arbitrator's decision. First, Virgin Islands substantive law, 
which incorporates rules of the common law in absence of 
local law to the contrary, see 1 V.I.C.S 4, provides that a 
court may enforce an arbitration award. See Restatement 
(Second) Contracts S 345(f).4 Second, section 2 of the FAA5 
requires a court to review the validity, irrevocability, and 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. The District Court 
held that the FAA's substantive provision in section 2 
applies to both federal and state courts, Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984),6 and that the Territorial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Restatement (Second) Contracts S 345(f) provides: 
 
       The judicial remedies available for the protection of interests 
stated 
       in S 344 [expectation, reliance, or restitution interests] include 
a 
       judgment or order . . . (f) enforcing an arbitration award 
 
5. 9 U.S.C. S 2 provides: 
 
       Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate 
 
       A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
       evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration 
       a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, 
       or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
       agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy 
       arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be 
valid, 
       irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law 
       or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
 6. See also Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal General Constr. Services 
Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Court is a state court for this purpose. See Harris v. 
Boreham, 233 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 
The District Court recognized that the United States 
Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on whether the 
procedural FAA provisions apply in a state or territorial 
court. The District Court ruled, however, based upon 
Supreme Court dicta and other precedents, that the 
procedural provisions in sections 3 and 4 of the FAA (orders 
to stay and to compel arbitration), applied in the Territorial 
Court. 
 
The DOJ timely filed its notice of appeal of the District 
Court's December 1, 1997 order on December 30, 1997. We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 
Section 23A(c) of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 
U.S.C. S 1613a(c). 
 
II. 
 
As both the Territorial Court and the District Court 
concluded, the plain language of the Writ of Review statute 
contemplates review of actions taken by the Government of 
the Virgin Islands qua government. The Arbitrator was 
neither a government employee, nor was he associated with 
the government. Accordingly, S 1421, which authorizes a 
Writ of Review only when the proceeding is before an 
"officer, board, commission, authority, or tribunal 
[government actors]," is inapplicable here. 
 
We therefore reject the two arguments made by the DOJ. 
First, the DOJ criticizes the Territorial Court for 
disregarding Territorial Court prior decisions that read the 
Writ of Review statute more broadly, entertaining 
jurisdiction under S 1421 of other than governmental 
determinations. Those decisions, as the District Court 
pointed out, are not binding on either the Appellate 
Division or, as we observe, on this court. Second, the DOJ 
argues that because the DOJ was a party to the contract, 
a statute providing review of government actions applies to 
the decision of the Arbitrator concerning such an 
employment contract. Because the DOJ does not have to 
agree to arbitration in its employment contracts, it argues, 
it may obtain review of the arbitration decision under the 
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Writ of Review statute. We reject this argument as well 
because the Government of the Virgin Islands is acting here 
as a litigant, the employer, and not as a governmental 
adjudicatory body. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
We must next consider whether the FAA applies to local 
matters litigated in the Territorial Court. Congress enacted 
the FAA pursuant to its power to define the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts and pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 
Congress, and thereafter the courts, intended to override 
the then-current federal courts practice of not favorably 
regarding arbitration clauses in contracts. "The basic 
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome 
courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate." Allied- 
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) 
(citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). As 
the District Court stated and as we agree, the Territorial 
Court is a state court for purposes of the FAA. See Harris 
v. Boreham, 233 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 
The FAA thus mandates that federal courts not review 
substantive decisions of arbitrators. Review of arbitration 
decisions is severely restricted and limited to, among other 
things, fraud, impartiality, or lack of jurisdiction. See 9 
U.S.C. S 10(a); see, e.g., Matteson v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 99 
F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1996); High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. 
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 879 F.2d 1215 
(3d Cir. 1989); Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 
F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1987); Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson 
Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986); Virgin Islands 
Nursing Association's Bargaining Unit v. Schneider, 668 
F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1981); Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris 
Upham & Co., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd, 
67 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 1995). Although the FAA applies by its 
terms to cases in federal courts, 9 U.S.C. #8E8E # 3-4, in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Allied- 
Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), 
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the Court reaffirmed that the FAA also applies in state 
courts to the extent that an arbitration provision affects 
interstate commerce. See also Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. 
Coastal Gen. Constr. Services Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 915 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Thus, in order for the FAA to apply in the 
Territorial Court, the arbitration at issue must affect 
interstate commerce as defined by Allied-Bruce. 
 
The District Court, in its opinion, stated that the Virgin 
Islands had not adopted statutes making the FAA 
applicable to the Virgin Islands Territorial Courts, and we 
are aware that the issue remains unsettled. The District 
Court, however, directed the Territorial Court, which is 
where arbitration decisions are to be enforced (or vacated) 
to "look to the substantive and procedural body of federal 
arbitration law for guidance in enforcing arbitration 
agreements." Government of the Virgin Islands v. United 
Industrial Workers of Am., D.C. Civ. App. No. 1992-022 
(D.V.I. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1997), at 16. 
 
We are of course aware of the Southland and Allied-Bruce 
requirement that a contract comes within the purview of 
the FAA only when an interstate nexus is shown. The 
Supreme Court has stated that the FAA's reach coincides 
with that of the Commerce Clause. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 
274. This broad interpretation of the FAA "is consistent 
with the [FAA]'s basic purpose, to put arbitration provisions 
`on the same footing' as a contract's other terms." Id. 
(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 
(1974)). 
 
While it is true that in this case the record is scant as to 
an interstate nexus, we recognize that the appellee United 
Industrial Workers of North America, Seafarers 
International Union, AFL-CIO itself, which represents 
Acker, is an international body embracing Union workers 
not only in the various states of the union, but in foreign 
countries as well. Its activities, by their very nature, qualify 
as having an interstate nexus. Moreover, we can take 
judicial notice that the Attorney General's office of the 
Virgin Islands, of which Acker was a member until his 
termination, has been and is involved with matters 
concerning the various states. See, e.g., Travel Services, Inc. 
v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 904 F.2d 186 (1990) 
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(assessment of tax on commissions earned from sale of 
airline tickets); Business Ventures International v. Olive, 893 
F.2d 641 (1990) (determination of tax liability for income 
unconnected with Virgin Islands' activity); Inter-Island 
Transport Line, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 539 
F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1976) (alleged breach of water-hauling 
contract between Government of the Virgin Islands and 
carrier); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Government of 
the Virgin Islands, 459 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1972) (whether tax 
on airlines' gross receipts violates Commerce Clause or 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States); Holmes v. 
Government of the Virgin Islands, 370 F. Supp. 715 (D.V.I. 
1974) (validity of act of legislature authorizing agreement 
between the Government of the Virgin Islands and a 
corporation intending to build an oil refinery); Southerland 
v. St. Croix Taxicab Ass'n, 315 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1963) 
(action by tour agency to prevent the Government of the 
Virgin Islands from interfering with tour agency's right to 
transport persons who purchased package tour); Virgo 
Corp. v. Paiewonsky, 254 F. Supp. 405 (D.V.I. 1966) 
(validity of tax of watches exported to United States 
customs area); see also The West Indian Co. v. Government 
of the Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(enforceability of contract between the Government of the 
Virgin Islands and a Danish-owned corporation). 
 
Although we recognize that the individual employment 
contract of Lawrence Acker can be construed narrowly as 
an employment contract of a local nature only, we are not 
persuaded that the character of his union, which negotiated 
the CBA, which sought to enforce the CBA, and which filed 
the grievance on behalf of Acker, and the nature of Acker's 
employment can be overlooked in determining whether the 
necessary interstate nexus for application of the FAA is 
present. Hence, we are satisfied that the FAA should be 
applied by the Territorial Court because its requirements 
have been met. See Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal 
Gen. Constr. Services Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
The appellant has called our attention to Great Western 
Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997), 
where the appellant argued that the FAA did not apply to 
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her employment contract because she fell within the scope 
of the exceptions to the FAA mandatory arbitration.7 We 
rejected her argument, relying upon Tenney Engineering, 
Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of Am., 
207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc), and we held that the 
exceptions to the FAA only applied to those employees 
working directly in the channels of commerce itself. Peacock 
did not fall within that classification, and neither does 
Acker in the present case. We are satisfied that while Acker 
was not employed directly in the channels of commerce, the 
FAA in this case nevertheless satisfies the interstate 
commerce nexus. 
 
B. 
 
Additionally, the District Court held that the provisions of 
the FAA apply within the Territorial Court by virtue of the 
common law of the Virgin Islands. We agree. Because there 
is no Virgin Islands statute on point, the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 345(f) provides a rule of law for the 
Virgin Islands. 1 V.I.C. S 4.8 Section 345(f) provides: 
 
       The judicial remedies available for the protection of 
       interests stated in S 344 [expectation, reliance, or 
       restitution interests] include a judgment or order . . . 
       (f) enforcing an arbitration award. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. That exception is found in S 1 of the FAA, which provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
       "Maritime transactions" and "commerce" defined; exceptions to 
       operation of title 
 
        . . . but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of 
       employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
       workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 
 
8. 1 V.I.C. S 4 provides: 
 
       The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of 
       law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not 
       so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United 
       States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin 
       Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws 
to 
       the contrary. 
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Comment (e) to S 345 states that "[b]ecause questions 
concerning the enforcement of arbitration awards depend 
largely on statute, they are not considered in detail in this 
Restatement." The Restatement contemplates that state 
courts will look to arbitration statutes for guidance. See 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So. 2d 102, 106 
(Ala. 1995) (opinion after remand) (adopting provisions of 
the FAA to define state law to the extent the FAA is 
consistent with otherwise-provided procedures of the state). 
The common law, as articulated by the Restatement, 
provides that arbitration law depends on statutory 
schemes, and thus the Territorial Court should apply the 
FAA scheme to questions of arbitration. 
 
If there is a difference between applying the FAA directly 
to the Territorial Court, as we now do, see supra III.A, or 
holding, as the District Court did, that the FAA "supplies 
the framework" for the Territorial Court, id. at 20, it is a 
difference without a distinction. We therefore take no great 
leap in holding the FAA applicable to the Virgin Islands in 
light of those provisions of the FAA that have been held to 
apply in the Territorial Court by the District Court 
Appellate Division and the common law of the Virgin Islands.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The opinion of Chief Judge Moore for the District Court included the 
provisions of S 10(a) of the FAA listing five factors for the Territorial 
Court to consider in reviewing the instant arbitration decision. In 
addition, it listed in the footnote those sections of the FAA that applied 
in the Territorial Court: 
 
       In addition to sections 9, 10(a), and 11, other sections of the FAA 
       clearly apply in Territorial Court. These include: section 3, 
providing 
       for a stay of proceedings where [the] issue therein [is] referable 
to 
       arbitration; section 4, for order to compel arbitration and 
judicial 
       enforcement; section 5, appointment of arbitrators or umpire; 
       section 6, application heard as motion; section 7, witnesses before 
       arbitrators, their fees, and compelling attendance; section 12, 
notice 
       of motions to vacate or modify and their service, and procedure for 
       staying proceedings; section 13, what papers must befiled for an 
       order confirming, modifying, or correcting award; and section 16, 
       appeals from actions of Territorial Court. There are some 
provisions 
       of the FAA which obviously would not apply in the Territorial Court 
       because they deal with strictly federal proceedings, e.g., 9 U.S.C. 
S 8 
       (proceedings begun by libel in admiralty and seizure of vessel or 
       property); id. S 10(b) (referring to 5 U.S.C. SS 372 & 380). 
 Government of the Virgin Islands v. United Industrial Workers of Am., 
D.C. Civ. App. No. 1992-022 (D.V.I. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1997), at 19 n.21. 
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IV. 
 
We hold that the Writ of Review statute, 5 V.I.C.SS 1421- 
23, does not provide the Territorial Court with jurisdiction 
to review a private arbitrator's decision. The Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. S 1-16, however, applies to 
appellant Lawrence Acker's employment contract by virtue 
of its interstate character and through application of the 
common law. 
 
We will therefore affirm the order dated December 1, 
1997, of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Appellate 
Division of St. Croix, and remand to the Territorial Court 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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